Date: Fri, 19 Jul 2002 04:54:18 +0200
From: FozZy <fozzy@dmpfrance.com>
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: Linux kernel setgid implementation flaw
--Multipart_Fri__19_Jul_2002_04:54:18_+0200_00261000
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Hi,
I believe the following to be accurate and of some interest to bugtraq
readers, although i did not have time to extensively test it, nor did i
warn the vendor, since 1) this is at most a undirect risk - IMHO - and 2) i am
going on holidays so i had to balance betweeen disclosing now and letting
people think about it and patch it OR delaying publication and forgetting it
for some months as usual ;) But as i said, it is only a subtle local flaw
that, i think, do not have direct security consequences in most linux
distributions. Unless someone see something i missed. Also, I apologise if
i am totally wrong here, no time to cross check it.
OVERVIEW
On current stable linux systems the setgid system call does not behave
correctly in certain conditions:
- Setgid-only programs cannot fully drop privileges.
- Programs with both setuid and setgid flags which call setuid(getuid) before
setgid(getgid) do not fully drop privileges.
"priviledges are not fully dropped" means that the saved gid remains 0,
although both gid, egid, fsgid, uid, euid, suid, and fsuid are set to
the unprivileged user id.
CONSEQUENCES
A setuid or setgid program can wish to give up its privileges as soon as it
does not need them anymore, if the program is written to minimise the
impact of a vulnerability in the now unprivileged part of the code. Note that
most linux set[ug]id progs seems to don't care too much about it. Surely in
owl linux and such they care more (and in openbsd for sure, but...).
The problem is, if a vulnerability (like a buffer overflow) appears in an
unprivileged part of the code, with current linux kernels the cracker will
still be able to get group id 0 (from the saved gid) ! That is a good launch
pad for gaining full root privileges.
Don't panic, the impact of this vulnerability is LOW in most (all ?) linux
distributions:
- it is local only (well, unless you wrote a daemon that thinks it can drop
group privileges *after* doing the setuid(userid) ! And unless you have a
setgid daemon or network client program).
- it needs for a setgid or setuid program to have an exploitable
vulnerability.
- it could be a serious vulnerability if security was not so low in current
linux systems. Most set[ug]id programs do not even bother to give up their
privileges, so locally exploiting them gives instant root.
- Programs which drop privileges before calling execve are not vulnerable
since exceve reset the saved uid (at least it should: not tested).
However, if you can find on your system a program that relies too much on the
setgid behavior and gives full control to the user on the process, this problem
would become a very serious vulnerability. I did not find any program of this
type on my Mandrake systems.
DETAILS
I tested this with a 2.4.3 kernel, and the latest 2.4.18 with the (excellent)
grsecurity patch.
>From the setgid manpage (conforming to most unix systems if not all):
"If the user is root or the program is setgid root, special care must be
taken. The setgid function checks the effective gid of the caller and if
it is the superuser, all process related group ID's are set to gid. After
this has occurred, it is impossible for the program to regain root privi╜
leges."
However:
[fozzy@defcon10 fozzy]$ uname -a
Linux 2.4.18-grsec-1.9.4 #5 (...)
[fozzy@defcon10 fozzy]$ ls -l dg
-r-xr-sr-x 1 root root 15525 jui 19 04:18 dg*
[fozzy@defcon10 fozzy]$ ./dg
uid=501, euid=501, gid=501, egid=0
--> suid=501 and sgid=0
Dropping privileges...
Privileges dropped : uid=501, euid=501, gid=501, egid=501
--> suid=501 and sgid=0
After trying to recover here is what we've got: uid=501, euid=501, gid=501,
egid=0
/\/\/\/\
See the attached source code of the program.
IN-DEPTH DETAILS
Here is the interesting part of the advisory: WHY ?
Well, easy. Let's take a look at the main part of the setgid syscall:
------------------------
if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
{
if(old_egid != gid)
current->dumpable=0;
current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid
= gid;
}
else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
{
if(old_egid != gid)
current->dumpable=0;
current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
}
-----------------------
If the process do not have the CAP_SETGID capability, current->sgid is
never modified ! It will remain 0 no matter what you do (well, actually, a
setregid will change the sgid, and a setresgid also, but everybody call the
standard setgid).
This capability is set only if you are the superuser (unless you
have set up a real capability-aware system of course). So it is not set when
running setgid programs, and in setuid programs it is unset when you do a
setuid(user).
As an untested 30 seconds-reflexion patch I would suggest editing the setgid
syscall in kernel/sys.c like this (last line in the above source code):
439c439
< current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
---
> current->egid = current->fsgid = current->sgid = gid;
CONCLUSION
See you in Marocco :)
FozZy
Hackademy & Hackerz Voice Director
--Multipart_Fri__19_Jul_2002_04:54:18_+0200_00261000
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="drop_gid.c"
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="drop_gid.c"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64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--Multipart_Fri__19_Jul_2002_04:54:18_+0200_00261000--
